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Abstract
With the opening of the National Museum of Afri-
can-American History, people are once again coming in 
mass to the National Mall to see the Smithsonian’s new-
est edition. And just about everyone in America knows of 
the Smithsonian--its name recognition is well over 90% 
in public surveys. Each year 30 million people visit the 
Smithsonian museums along the National Mall in Wash-
ington, D.C., the National Air and Space Museum, the 
National Museum of American History, and the Nation-
al Museum of Natural  History among them. But is that 
about to change? The Smithsonian is an odd government 
entity. Despite its private, non-profit status, the Smithso-
nian still receives federal funds, is chartered by an Act 
of Congress, employs a majority civil service staff, and 
operates through a board overseen by the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court, the Vice President, and legislators 
from the United States Senate and Congress. As such, the 
Smithsonian has been deemed a governmental entity is 
some instances and a private entity in others. However, 
with a new bill being introduced to Congress and re-
cent Supreme Court precedent regarding government 
Resumo
Com a abertura do Museu Nacional de História Afro-Ame-
ricana, as pessoas estão novamente vindo em massa ao 
National Mall para ver a mais nova edição do Smithsonian. 
E quase todos americanos conhecem o Smithsonian – de 
modo que seu reconhecimento ultrapassa os 90% nas pes-
quisas públicas. Todos os anos, 30 milhões de pessoas visi-
tam os museus Smithsonian ao longo do National Mall em 
Washington, D.C., o Museu Nacional do Ar e do Espaço, o 
Museu Nacional de História Americana e o Museu Nacional 
de História Natural. Mas algo pode mudar? O Smithsonian 
é uma peculiar entidade governamental. Apesar de sua na-
tureza privada, sem fins lucrativos, o Smithsonian recebe 
recursos federais, e amparado por uma lei do Congresso, a 
maioria do pessoal empregado é agente público. Seu fun-
cionamento é supervisionado pelo Presidente da Suprema 
Corte, pelo Vice-Presidente, e pelos parlamentares do Sena-
do e do Congresso. Deste modo, o Smithsonian ora é consi-
derado como entidade governamental, ora como entidade 
privada. No entanto, essa indecisão pode mudar, tendo em 
vista um Projeto de Lei apresentado no Congresso e novo 
precedente da Suprema Corte. Neste esteio, o Smithsonian 
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instrumentalities, the Smithsonian may face dissolution 
of its current supervisory board less it run the risk of vio-
lating the separation of powers doctrine.
Keywords: unconstitucional; separation of powers; 
Smithsonian Institution; American Administrative Law; 
governmental entity.
pode ter dissolvido seu atual conselho de supervisão, ve-
redito que gera menos impacto na doutrina da separação 
dos poderes.
Palavras-chave: inconstitucionalidade; separação de po-
deres; Instituição Smithsonian; Direito Administrativo nor-
teamericano; entidade governamental.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
In July 2016, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Colum-
bia introduced Smithsonian Modernization Act that if passed, would change the com-
position of Smithsonian Institution’s governing board—the Board of Regents— and 
increase transparency of internal operations and deliberations. Norton justified the 
legislation, saying there needs to be greater transparency and accountability of the 
Smithsonian’s operations given that it expends taxpayer dollars. Norton was motivated 
to introduce the bill because of “[t]he recent history of mismanagement at the Smith-
sonian” under the former Secretary of the Smithsonian, Lawrence Small. Norton explai-
ned that the Board of Regents have significant “fiduciary responsibility[ies]” and the 
Smithsonian being “supported primarily by federal funds must be accountable to the 
American people.”1   
But for Norton, transparency is not enough; the composition of the Board of 
Regents also needs to be reformed.  Norton thinks Board of Regents should “be compri-
sed entirely of private citizens, who can assist with fundraising, to replace highly-placed 
public officials currently serving on the board.”2  Norton’s fundraising complaint seems 
largely superficial as the 
Smithsonian raises more $200 million in private funds annually.  Nevertheless, 
Norton’s bill draws attention to the unique high-ranking U.S. officials who serve on the 
Board of Regents--the Vice President of the United States, the Chief Justice of the Supre-
me Court, three members of the U.S. Senate, three members of the House of Represen-
tatives, and nine citizen members.  
1  Norton Introduces Bill to Increase Transparency & Accountability at the Smithsonian Institution, NortonHouse.Gov (July 
29, 2015). Avaiable at: <https://norton.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/norton-introduces-billto-increase-transparency
-and-accountability-at>.
2  Id.; Smithsonian Modernization Act of 2015. 
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Although some legal scholars have in the past drawn attention to the unique 
composition of the Smithsonian’s governing board, recent decisions regarding corpo-
rate agencies that constitute government instrumentalities bring to bear special atten-
tion in considering possible separation of powers problems for the Smithsonian espe-
cially in the context of a formalist analysis.  
2.  ESTABLISHMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF THE SMITHSONIAN 
In 1826, James Smithson wrote his will in London. Smithson was the illegitimate 
son of an English aristocrat who made a fortune in investments in the early industrial 
revolution and also inherited money from his mother.3  In his will, he left a bequest 
to his nephew, but noted that if his nephew died without leaving an heir, his fortune 
would go “to the United States of America, to found at Washington, under the name of 
the Smithsonian Institution, an Establishment for the increase & diffusion of knowledge 
among men.”4 
Smithson died in 1829, and it was only a few years later that officials in the U.S. 
were informed of the bequest, which amounted to about £100,000 or about $500,000, 
which then was a large sum of money.5 The U.S. Congress debated for some time whe-
ther or not to accept the funds.6 Opponents pointed to the fact that accepting the 
funds and founding an institution as Smithson had specified was not something the 
Federal government had the constitutional power to do.7 Supporters ingeniously ar-
gued that the U.S. could accept the bequest and establish the institution under the 
powers granted Congress of exclusive legislation over the District of Columbia,8 where 
the Smithsonian would be established—even though its purpose would be for “among 
men” presumably everywhere.9
Congress passed a bill to acquire the Smithson bequest from England in 1835, 
and three years later, the funds came to the U.S. and were deposited in the U.S. Treasury. 
Several years of debate ensued in Congress with alternative proposals for what the Smi-
thsonian should be and do—with some proposing a national library, others a national 
3  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. General History. Smithsonian Archives. Available at: <http://siarchives.si.edu/history/general
-history>.
4  CURRIE, David P. The Smithsonian. The University of Chicago Law Review, Chicago,  vol. 70, n. 1, p. 65-71, jan./mar. 2003.
5  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. General History. Smithsonian Archives. Available at: <http://siarchives.si.edu/history/general
-history>.
6  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. General History. Smithsonian Archives. Available at: <http://siarchives.si.edu/history/general
-history>.
7  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. General History. Smithsonian Archives. Available at: <http://siarchives.si.edu/history/general
-history>.
8  UNITED STATES. Constitution art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District). 
9  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. General History. Smithsonian Archives. Available at: <http://siarchives.si.edu/history/general
-history>.
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university, an astrophysical observatory, a museum, and an agricultural research center. 
Finally, in 1846, Congress passed and President Polk signed into law the statue esta-
blishing the Smithsonian. Sections of that act are reproduced below: 
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE “SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION” FOR THE INCREASE AND DIFFU-
SION OF KNOWLEDGE AMONG MEN.  
James Smithson, esquire, of London, in the Kingdom of Great Britain, having by his last 
will and testament given the whole of his property to the United States of America, to 
found at Washington, under the name of the “Smithsonian Institution,” an establishment 
for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men; and the United States having, 
by an act of Congress, received said property and accepted said trust; Therefore, For the 
faithful execution of said trust, according to the will of the liberal and enlightened donor; 
Be it Enacted By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled. That the President and Vice-President of the United States, the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the 
Navy, the Postmaster-General, the Attorney General, the Chief Justice, and the Commis-
sioner of the Patent 
Office of the United States; and the mayor of the city of Washington, during the time for 
which they shall hold their respective offices, and such other persons as they may elect 
honorary members, be, and they are hereby constituted, an “establishment,” by the name 
of the “Smithsonian Institution,” for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among 
men; and by that name shall be known and have perpetual succession, with the powers, 
limitations, and restrictions, hereinafter contained, and no other. . .   
And be it further enacted, That the business of the said Institution shall be conducted at 
the City of Washington by a board of regents, by the name of regents of the “Smithsonian 
Institution,” to be composed of the Vice-President of the United States, the Chief Justice 
of the United States, and the Mayor of the City of Washington, during the time for which 
they shall hold their respective offices; three members of the Senate, and three members 
of the House of Representatives; together with six other persons, other than members of 
Congress, two of whom shall be members of the national institute in the City of Washing-
ton, and resident in the said city; and the other four thereof shall be inhabitants of States, 
and no two of them of the same State. And the regents to be selected as aforesaid shall 
be appointed immediately after the passage of this act-the members of the Senate by 
Unconstitutional limbo: why the Smithsonian Institution may violate the separation of powers doctrine
39Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 3, p. 35-60, set./dez. 2017.
the President thereof, the members of the House by the Speaker thereof, and the six other 
persons by Joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives... 
And the said Regents shall meet in the City of Washington, on the first Monday of Sep-
tember next after the passage of this act, and organize by the election of one of their 
number as chancellor, who shall be the presiding officer of said board of regents, by the 
name of the Chancellor of the “Smithsonian Institution,” and a suitable person as secre-
tary of said Institution, who shall also be the secretary of said board of regents;  . . . 
And be it further enacted, That, in proportion as suitable arrangements can be made 
for their reception, all objects of art and of foreign and curious research, and all objects 
of natural history, plants, and geological and mineralogical specimens, belonging, or 
hereafter to belong, to the United States, which may be in the city of Washington, in 
whosesoever custody the same may be, shall be delivered to such persons as may be 
authorized by the board of regents to receive them, and shall be arranged in such order, 
and so classed, as best [to] facilitate the examination and study of them, in the building 
so as aforesaid to be erected for the institution;  . . . 
And be it further enacted, That the secretary of the board of regents shall take charge of 
the building and property of said institution, and shall, under their direction, make a fair 
and accurate record of all their proceedings, to be preserved in said institution; and the 
said secretary shall also discharge the duties of Librarian and of keeper of the museum, 
and may, with the consent of the board of regents, employ assistants; and the said offi-
cers shall receive for their services such sums as may be allowed by the board of regents, 
to be paid semi-annually on the first day of January and July; and the said officers shall 
be removable by the board of regents, whenever, in their judgment, the interests of the 
institution require any of the said officers to be changed.10   
 
Of note, the Smithsonian “Establishment” of which the President of the Uni-
ted States serves as the “presiding officer” has only rarely met – formally nine times in 
all, and for the last time in 1877.11  The business of the Smithsonian is conducted by 
the Board of Regents. The founding act charged the Regents with the building of the 
10  UNITED STATES. An Act to Establish the Smithsonian Institution for the Increase & Diffusion of Knowledge Among Men, 
9 Stat 102 (1846). Available at: <http://siarchives.si.edu/sites/default/files/pdfs/9_Stat_102.pdf>. 
11 Conference on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution is Held, Smithsonian Archives (1927). Available at: <http://siarchives.
si.edu/collections/siris_sic_11657>. GOODE, George Brown (Ed.). The Smithsonian Institution, 1846-1896, The History of its 
First Half Century. New York: De Vinne Press, 1897.
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institution’s headquarters, now popularly known as the Castle. The Chancellor was in 
the first years of the Smithsonian the Vice President of the United States, but after a 
series of deaths, the office became, by custom occupied by the Chief Justice. The Se-
cretary served as the executive officer of the Smithsonian, selected by the Regents, but 
not on the board. In its early years, the Smithsonian’s budget came entirely from the 
funds left by Smithson. In the mid-1850s the Smithsonian received its first appropriated 
budget from the federal government. Given that the position of Mayor of the District 
of Columbia was superseded by the Governor in 1871 and that office abolished after 
1874, the position was dropped from the Board of Regents in a 1894 amendment to the 
Smithsonian statute. In 1970, the statute was again amended so that nine, rather than 
six citizens served on the board. 
Currently, the Smithsonian is a complex museum, research and educational 
organization. 
It has grown to include 19 museums, most but not all of them authorized by 
Congress. It receives $840 million in annual appropriations from Congress via the Inte-
rior and Related Agencies Subcommittee in the House and Appropriations Subcommit-
tee on the Interior, Environment and Related Agencies Committee in the Senate. It also 
gets grants from government agencies like NASA, US AID, and the Department of Edu-
cation. It receives gifts from donors, foundations and corporate sponsors amounting to 
over $200 million. It runs businesses like Smithsonian magazine and a cable television 
channel that generate more than $150 million in revenue annually. The funds that came 
with the Smithson bequest have grown to an endowment of over $1 billion. Of its 6,500 
employees, over 4,000 are federal employees paid with annually appropriate funds, the 
others are known as “trust-fund” employees, and they are paid with nonfederal, private 
funds and earned revenue.12   
The Smithsonian’s Board of Regents meets regularly, several times a year. Its 
powers include electing the Secretary, approving the submission of the federal budget 
to Congress, approving annual trust fund spending and the investment of the Smithso-
nian endowment, accepting gifts, designating names of galleries and museums, selec-
ting sites of new museums, approving strategic and other plans, appointing members 
of museum boards, acquiring properties, and exercising other governance functions. 
All Regents serve as principal officers as they are entitled to one vote.13-14 Approval or 
disproval of any action is done by majority vote.16 
12  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Smithsonian Institution FY 2016 Budget Justification to Congress. Available at: <http://
www.si.edu/content/pdf/about/fy2016-budgetrequest.pdf>.
13  See UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 
(2015) (Alito, J. concurring) (“ever multimember body heading agency must also be a principal officer [because] every member 
could cast the deciding vote with a particular decision.”); Bylaws of the Board of Regents §2.06 (2014) 16 Bylaws of the Board 
of Regents §2.06 (2014). 
14  20 U.S.C. § 44; Smithsonian Inst. Bylaws of the Board of Regents §2.09 (2014). 
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Regents may abstain from voting on an action. Eight members are required for 
quorum.17 
3.  THE SMITHSONIAN’S LEGAL STATUS
Congress, the Smithsonian itself, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Cou-
nsel 15 and even the courts have been hard pressed to take on the challenge of defining 
the Smithsonian exact legal status; for doing so can pose a nightmare in considering 
where in and out of the government it belongs, and whether or not its status violates 
the separation of powers.16   
In 1927, former U.S. President Howard Taft, then serving as Chief Justice and 
also Smithsonian Chancellor, declared, “the Smithsonian Institution is not, and has ne-
ver been considered a government bureau. It is a private institution under the guar-
dianship of the  Government.”17  
Taft’s argument was reframed by the Office of Legal Counsel in 1976, which 
opined: 
The Smithsonian is an establishment created by Federal statutes in order to fulfill a basic 
trust obligation originating in the will of James Smithson. But it is so uniquely distincti-
ve a fusion of public and private cooperation and of joint action by all three traditional 
branches of our government that it seems fairly evident that the Congress could not have 
meant it to be treated as a traditional agency.18  
 
The Office of Legal Counsel considered whether the Smithsonian was in the exe-
cutive branch, but although the Vice President is a member of the Board of Regents, he 
is ex officio and not appointed to that post by the President and thus “under no executi-
ve power of control or appointment.” If the Smithsonian were an “executive agency” the 
fact that fifteen of its seventeen members – the three senators, three representatives 
and nine citizens – were appointed by Congress would raise serious separation of 
15  UNITED STATES. Memorandum for the Director, Office of Personnel Management from Assistant Attorney General Ulman, 
3 Op. O.L.C. 274, 277 (1979) (“The Smithsonian is sui generis: a fusion of a private and public body and a joint instrument, in a 
sense, of all three branches of the Government.”) 
16  COLUMBIA. Dong v. Smithsonian Inst. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 125 F.3d 877, 877 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 877, 879. (“Indeed, if the Smithsonian were to wield executive powers, the method by which its Regents are 
appointed would appear to violate the Constitution’s separation of powers principles.”). 
17  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Memorandum to Peter Powers, General Counsel, the Smithsonian Institution from Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Ulman, 19 feb. 1976.
18  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Memorandum to Peter Powers, General Counsel, the Smithsonian Institution from Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Ulman, 19 feb. 1976.
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powers issues since the Congress cannot appoint executive officers of the U.S. under 
Article II, Section II of the Constitution.  
The Office of Legal Counsel also opined that the Smithsonian, given its func-
tion, could not be considered an “independent regulatory agency,” and “not the sort of 
instrumentality of the United States which the Congress intended to include” as either 
“administrative,” or “executive,” or “regulatory” at least in the context of particular laws.19 
The Office of Legal Counsel in 1976 wrote that “it could be argued that the Smithso-
nian is ... an arm of the Congress itself,” but has failed to take up or buttress that argu-
ment.20 The best the Office of Legal Counsel could come up with is that the “bequest 
was accepted and has since been treated by the United States as a solemn testamen-
tary trust independent of any traditional branch or role of government but operated as 
a responsibility of the Nation.”21 In another opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote, 
“The Smithsonian is sui generis: a fusion of a private and public body and a joint instru-
ment, in a sense, of all three branches of the Government.”22 Thus, in the mindset of one 
analyst, the practice of Constitutional avoidance about the Smithsonian’s status had 
been strictly abided.23 
This practice has generally resulted in various opinions from the Office of Legal 
Counsel treating the Smithsonian’s legal status in the context of particular legislation.24 
The U.S. 
Attorney General has found that the Smithsonian enjoys sovereign immunity 
from state and local regulation in some instances because the Smithsonian is “so clo-
sely connected” to the federal government.25  The Smithsonian has federal sovereign 
immunity for some lawsuits, except those that Congress has explicitly authorized, whi-
ch include FTCA, Copyright Act, the Tucker Act for contract, and discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.26 In O’Rourke, the Court found the FTCA did apply to the 
19  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Memorandum to Peter Powers, General Counsel, the Smithsonian Institution from Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Ulman, 19 feb. 1976.
20  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Memorandum to Peter Powers, General Counsel, the Smithsonian Institution from Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Ulman, 19 feb. 1976.
21  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Memorandum to Peter Powers, General Counsel, the Smithsonian Institution from Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Ulman, 19 feb. 1976.
22  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Memorandum for the Director, Office of Personnel Management from Assistant Attorney Gene-
ral Ulman. Opinion of the Office of Legal Concern, Washington, vol.  3, 1979.  
23  See, e.g., UNITED STATES. O’Rourke v. Smithsonian Inst. Press, 399 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2005); SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. 
Memorandum to Peter Powers, General Counsel, the Smithsonian Institution from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ulman, 
19 feb. 1976.
24  See KMIEC, Douglas W. The Status of the Smithsonian Institution Under the Federal Property and Administrative Services 
Act. Opinion of the Office of Legal Concern, Washington, vol. 12, 122-127, june 1988. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/
file/24096/download>.
25  See SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Memorandum to Assistant General Counsel, the Smithsonian Institution from Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Moss, 25 apr. 1997.
26  SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Legal Nature of the Smithsonian. Available at: <www.si.edu/OGC/legal history>.
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Smithsonian because the definition of a federal agency “includes ... independent esta-
blishments of the United States.27 
In Cotton v. Adams, the court found the Smithsonian was subject to FOIA be-
cause Congress had amended the definition of a qualifying agency “to include those 
entities which may not be considered agencies under section 551(1) of Title 5, U.S.Code, 
but which perform governmental functions and control information of interest to the 
public.”28 The court stated that “The Smithsonian is subject to the FOIA because it per-
forms governmental functions as a center of scholarship and national museum respon-
sible for the safekeeping and maintenance of national treasures.” The court also found 
other factors indicative FOIA’s applicability, including that “the Smithsonian receives 
federal funds for many of its operations, that it is chartered by an Act of Congress, and 
that it has a majority of civil service employees. Furthermore, the Smithsonian receives 
the benefits of agency status by virtue of the fact that it receives representation from 
the United States Attorney, absolute governmental immunity in libel suits, and other 
benefits in property transfers.”29 
In Rivera v. Heyman, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that the 
Smithsonian had discriminated against him in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.  The court, ruled that such lawsuits did not apply to the Smithsonian because at 
that time the Rehabilitation Act incorporated the Civil Rights Act’s limited sovereign 
immunity waiver provision.30  Under that provision, suits against the federal govern-
ment extended only to “executive agencies as defined in Section 105 of title 5” or those 
listed in the Act.31  In Rivera the court rule against the plaintiff because the Smithsonian 
was not a listed entity nor was the Smithsonian an “executive” agency because it lacked 
characteristics of being an establishment in the executive branch. Specifically, the Smi-
thsonian didn’t report to the President or perform an executive activity.32-33-34  
27  UNITED STATES. O’Rourke v. Smithsonian Inst. Press, 399 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) The Court of Federal Claims held that 
the Smithsonian Institution fell within term “United States,” for purposes granting the Court exclusive jurisdiction over copyright 
infringement because – more than two-thirds of Smithsonian’s workforce were federal employees, Congress appropriated funds 
expressly for Smithsonian’s preparation and publication of books, judgments against Smithsonian were paid from United States 
Treasury, Smithsonian was represented by federal attorneys, and persons responsible for Smithsonian’s operations were either 
United States officials of highest rank or Congressional appointees.
28  COLUMBIA. Cotton v. Adams. District Court for the District of Columbia - June 26. 1992. 798 F. Supp. 22, 24.
29  COLUMBIA. Cotton v. Adams. District Court for the District of Columbia - June 26. 1992. 798 F. Supp. 22, 24.
30  NEW YORK. Rivera v. Heyman. District Court for the Southern District of New York - 982 F. Supp. 932. October 7, 1997, 982 F. 
Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998). 
31  NEW YORK. Rivera v. Heyman. District Court for the Southern District of New York - 982 F. Supp. 932. October 7, 1997, 982 F. 
Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998).
32  NEW YORK. Rivera v. Heyman. District Court for the Southern District of New York - 982 F. Supp. 932. October 7, 1997, 982 F. 
Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998).
33  42 USC § 2000e-16(a)  
34  29 U.S.C. § 633a 
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However, the Smithsonian became subject to suits under Title VII and Rehabi-
litation Act when Congress amended the Workforce Investment Act, which added the 
Smithsonian to the list of federal government employers that are prohibited from en-
gaging in such discrimination.  Similarly, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, adding the Smithsonian to the list of entities prohibited from discri-
minating on account of age in Federal Government employment.  
In Dong, a case involving the privacy rights of a Smithsonian employee of the 
Hirschhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, the court found that the Smithsonian’s was 
not an “agency” covered under the Privacy Act.35 Similar to Rivera, the court reasoned 
that based on the definition of agency “it is plain that the Smithsonian is not an esta-
blishment in the executive branch.” Additionally, the Dong Court held that the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act did not apply to the Smithsonian because it lacked “substantial 
independent authority to take final binding action affecting the rights and obligations 
of individuals, particularly by the characteristic procedures of rule-making and adjudi-
cation.” 36 
Courts have similarly rejected the idea that the Smithsonian is not a government 
controlled corporation. In Dong, the court rejected that argument because the relevant 
section listed only corporations in the executive branch.37A federal corporation may 
however be considered a government instrumentality subject to coverage without 
being strictly established in the executive branch.38 For example, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority is a government corporation, understood to be outside of the executive bran-
ch – it being essentially a government-run business. However, Assistant Attorney Gene-
ral Ulman found Section 461(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 661(a), authorizes the President 
to promulgate regulations implementing § 459 for the executive branch, including any 
wholly owned Federal corporation created by act of Congress, [and therefore] may co-
ver payments for Federal workers’ compensation payments from the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) retirement system.”39 Thus TVA may be a Federal instrumentality based 
on the view that the retirement system was established by a “under statutory authority 
to further its purposes by enhancing the welfare of its employees.”40
35  COLUMBIA. Dong v. Smithsonian Inst. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. -, (D.C. Cir. 1997) 125 
F.3d 877. 
36  COLUMBIA. Dong v. Smithsonian Inst. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. -, (D.C. Cir. 1997) 125 
F.3d 877.
37  COLUMBIA. Dong v. Smithsonian Inst. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. -, (D.C. Cir. 1997) 125 
F.3d 877.
38  See UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015); 
UNITED STATES. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R Passenger Corp. Supreme Court Of The United States. 513 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1995).  
39  UNITED STATES. Memorandum for the Director, Office of Personnel Management from Assistant Attorney General Ulman. 
Opinion of the Office of Legal Concern, Washington, vol.  3, 274-242, 1979. 
40  UNITED STATES. Memorandum for the Director, Office of Personnel Management from Assistant Attorney General Ulman. 
Opinion of the Office of Legal Concern, Washington, vol.  3, 274-242, 1979.
Unconstitutional limbo: why the Smithsonian Institution may violate the separation of powers doctrine
45Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 3, p. 35-60, set./dez. 2017.
4.  OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES 
The TVA opinion raises the question of how the status of other federal instru-
mentalities may bear on the status of the Smithsonian, its constitutionality and regard 
for the separation of powers.  
Consider Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, in which Michael 
Lebron, an artist, sued Amtrak because it rejected his lease of a billboard advertisement 
at Penn Station in New York. Lebron’s advertisement consisted of a photo-montage 
depictions of war in Nicaragua including a Coors beer can and textual criticism of the 
Coors family for supporting the Contras, a right-wing counter-revolutionary group.41 
Lebron had signed a contract giving Amtrak approval as to the character, text, illustra-
tion, design, and operation of the advertisement. Amtrak deemed the artistic depiction 
on the billboard to be “political” and rejected the work. Lebron sued 
Amtrak claiming the basis for the rejection violated the First Amendment. The 
case went to the Supreme Court over the issue of Amtrak’s governmental status, with 
Lebron first claiming Amtrak was close to the government and then later a “government 
entity.” The court, with Scalia writing for the majority, held that Amtrak was a govern-
ment instrumentality, thus part of the Government for purposes of a First Amendment 
claim.42 Although the Federal statute chartering Amtrak disavowed it was a govern-
ment agency, the Court found the disclaimer is insufficient for exempting the Gover-
nment from Constitutional restrictions where the government has used Amtrak as an 
instrument for government action. Thus, the court considered several factors in deter-
mining what about Amtrak’s status that qualified it as a government instrumentality.    
Scalia noted that “Amtrak was created by a special statute, explicitly for the fur-
therance of federal governmental goals.” Six of the corporation’s directors are appoin-
ted by the President of the United States – four of them with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. For Scalia, Amtrak “is established and organized under federal law for 
the very purpose of pursuing federal governmental objectives, under the direction and 
control of federal governmental appointees. It is in that respect no different from the 
so-called independent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Com-
mission or the Securities Exchange Commission, which are run by Presidential appoin-
tees with fixed terms.” The directors, except for the Secretary of Transportation are “not, 
by the explicit terms of the statute, removable by the President for cause, and are not 
impeachable by Congress.”43
If Amtrak’s status is suggestive of some of the characteristics of the Smithso-
nian, another case, Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads asserts that a government 
41  UNITED STATES. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R Passenger Corp. Supreme Court Of The United States. 513 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1995).
42  UNITED STATES. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R Passenger Corp. Supreme Court Of The United States. 513 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1995).
43  513 U.S. 374, 397-98. 
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instrumentality exercising vested power that affects private rights must comply with 
the constitutional separation of power requirements. In 2008, under the Passenger Rail 
Investment and Improvement Act, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Ad-
ministration the authority to issue metrics and standards concerning the on-time and 
delayed performance of passenger railroad service on track caused by host railroads, 
like the members of The Association of Railroads. The Association sued the Department 
of Transportation—because it held all of Amtrak’s preferred stock and most of its com-
mon stock, claiming it was unconstitutional for Congress to allow Amtrak as a private 
company to exercise authority over such standards. The District Court rejected the As-
sociation’s claim, but the DC Circuit reversed on the separation of powers claim that a 
private corporation could not constitutionally be granted regulatory power. The Supre-
me Court vacated the Circuit ruling on the grounds that Amtrak was a governmental 
entity under the purposes of the Act.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that both the Respondent and 
the Court of Appeals relied upon statutory directives that Amtrak “shall be operated 
and managed as a for profit corporation” and is “not a department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the United States Government.” §§ 24301(a)(2)-(3). But he rejected that 
assertion, noting the appointees to the Amtrak board of directors, and that it had re-
ceived about $1 billion a year from the federal government.  Kennedy cited Lebron and 
wrote that, for purposes of Amtrak’s status as a federal actor or instrumentality under 
the Constitution, the practical reality of federal control and supervisions prevails over 
Congress’ disclaimer of Amtrak’s governmental status. Treating Amtrak as governmen-
tal for these purposes, moreover, is not an unbridled grant of authority to an unaccou-
ntable actor. The political branches created Amtrak, control its Board, define its mission, 
specify many of its day to day operations, have imposed substantial transparency and 
accountability mechanisms, and, for all practical purposes, set and supervise its annual 
budget. Accordingly, the Court holds that Amtrak is a governmental entity, not a priva-
te one, for purposes of determining the constitutional issues presented in this case.44 
Kennedy asserted that “exercise of governmental power must be consistent 
with the design and requirements of the Constitution, including those provisions rela-
ting to the separation of powers.”45  
Though he concurs with Kennedy, Justice Thomas takes the matter further. He 
argues that “A determination that Amtrak acts as a government entity in crafting the 
metrics and standards says nothing about whether it properly exercises governmental 
power when it does so.” 
44  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225. 
45  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225. 
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Thomas does not believe Amtrak is “properly constituted to exercise a power 
under one of the Vesting Clauses.”46  To the extent Amtrak’s promulgation of metrics 
and standards rules for the private railroads to follow constitute legislative power, Tho-
mas says it is unconstitutional. “Amtrak is not Congress.” Amtrak’s rules do not “comply 
with bicameralism and presentment” under Article I, § 7.”47
Justice Alito’s concurrence explains more about what constitutional restrains 
would qualify to make Amtrak remain subject to Presidential control.48 “[A]ccountability 
demands that principal officer be appointed by the President, and this principle applies 
with special force to those who can ‘exercise significant authority’ without direct super-
vision.”49 Alito acknowledges that “a multimember body may head an agency,” such as 
in the case of Free Enterprise Fund. But in such instances, Alito clarifies, that “those who 
head agencies must be principal officers.”50  Alito says “because agency heads must be 
principal officers, ever multimember body heading an agency must also be a principal 
officer.” “[E]very member of a multimember body could cast the deciding vote with a 
particular decision.”51 Therefore, because “anyone who has the unilateral authority to 
tip a final decision one way or the other cannot be an inferior officer.”52  
Alito discounts the notion that Amtrak’s president could be an inferior officer. 
But even entertaining the idea the Amtrak president was, there would still be consti-
tutional defects.53 Under Art. II § 2, cl. 2, Congress would be able to vest the head of a 
department with the authority to appoint of an inferior officer. However, “it is not clear 
that Amtrak is a Department.”54 
Members of Congress, with power over the Smithsonian’s legislation and bud-
get also sit on its Board of Regents. Given the arguable need for a federal instrumentali-
ty to comply with the separation of powers, the case of Metro. Washington Airports Auth. 
(MWAA) v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., may be instructive. MWAA, con-
cerned with the operation of District of Columbia area airports, challenged the consti-
tutionality of a review board created by legislation transferring control of airports from 
Congress to a local authority. The Federal Government has a strong and continuing 
46  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225. at 1253 
(Thomas, J. concurring). 
47  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225. at 1254 
(Thomas, J. concurring). 
48  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225. at 1240 
(Alito, J. concurring) 
49  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225. at 1240 
(Alito, J. concurring)
50  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1239.
51  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1239.
52  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1239.
53  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1239.
54  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1239.
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interest in the efficient operation of the airports, which are vital to the smooth con-
duct of Government business conditioned the transfer to the Airport Authority provi-
ded that legislators had voting rights on Board of Review, which had authority over air 
transportation decisions.55 
The Supreme Court stated that for a separation of powers analysis, it is unne-
cessary to determine as the Court of Appeals did, that the Board of Review exercised 
“quintessentially executive power” by making ‘key operational decisions’ affecting a lo-
cal public airport (public entity). It is sufficient to conclude that Congress exceeded its 
constitutional authority in its manner of inserting itself into the execution of the airport 
affairs.  Specifically, by requiring members of Congress be on the Board of Review, ca-
pable of vetoing particular plans regarding the operation or management of airport 
failed to comply with legislative power constraints of bicameralism and presentment.56 
Congress’ conditioning of transfer of District of Columbia area airports to local 
authority upon creation of Board of Review composed of congressmen and having veto 
power over decisions of local authority’s directors violated separation of powers. The 
Court stated that “if the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent 
of Congress to exercise it.” The Court then turned to analyze whether Congress exerci-
sing veto power over the airport’s board of directors’s decision was an unconstitutional 
exercise of legislative power. The Court stated that “if the power is legislative, Congress 
must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirement.”57 
5.  ANALYSIS: DOES THE SMITHSONIAN VIOLATE THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS?
5.1.  The Formalist Objection 
 The doctrine of separation of powers reflects a view that the Constitution res-
tricts the exercise of Federal Government power that may be judicially redressible. The 
two prominent views for separation of powers analysis are functionalism and formalism. 
Functionalists believe that “Congress is substantially free reign to innovate as 
long as the particular scheme satisfies the functional aims of the constitutional struc-
ture taken as a whole.”58 
55  UNITED STATES. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise. Supreme Court of United 
States. Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 266-(1991). 
56  UNITED STATES. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise. Supreme Court of United 
States. Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 266 (1991).
57  UNITED STATES. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise. Supreme Court of United 
States. Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 266 (1991) at 276. 
58  MANNING, John F. Separation of Powers As Ordinary Interpretation. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, vol. 124, p. 1942-2040, 
1939.
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Functionalist are interested in maintaining a “workable government.” The “pri-
mary concern is whether the challenged government scheme disrupts the proper ba-
lance between coordinate branches.” The problem with Functionalism, as one scholar 
notes, is that the approach “guards against sudden grasps of power, but not against 
step-by-step encroachment that result in large power grabs.”59  
Formalism, on the other hand, invokes a strict textualist approach to the Cons-
titution.  A formalist will enforce what he regards as the text’s formal lines of separa-
tion.”  A challenged exercise of government power is checked against Constitutional 
“procedural requirements,” such as the Vesting and Appointments Clauses. The “Consti-
tution draws sharply defined and judiciable enforceable lines among the three distinct 
government branches.” Formalists also believe the Constitution’s structure within the 
document support a “free standing separation of powers.”  Therefore, the challenged 
arrangement must affect powers in a manner or degree that is constitutionally prohi-
bited.”60Although a formalist analysis may be more restrictive on government arrange-
ments and possibly less supportive of realistic means for governance or the New Deal 
administrative state, the advantages of formalism is that the adherence to Constitu-
tional text is more reliable. The analysis construes the Constitution in a manner that 
gives notice of prohibited behavior and thus promotes more consistent rulings, and 
reliance in devising a statutory scheme or other exercise of Vested federal government 
power. Accordingly, this paper applies a formalist analysis in reviewing challenged go-
vernment action discussed below. 
Determining whether a branch of the Federal Government or its delegate viola-
tes the separation of powers turns on whether the Constitution forbids allocating “le-
gislative, executive, or judicial powers of the Federal Government” stemming from the 
Vesting Clauses “to an ineligible entity.”61 
Justice Thomas analyzes a separation of power by applying the non-delegation 
doctrine.  
Justice Thomas says that “[t]he Constitution does not vest the Federal Govern-
ment with an undifferentiated governmental power” but instead “identifies three types 
59  STRAUSS, Peter. Formal & Functional Approcaches to Separation of Powers Questions – A Foolish Inconsistency? Cornell Law 
Review, New York, vol. 72, n. 3, p. 488-526, mar. 1987. p. 513.
60  MANNING, John F. Separation of Powers As Ordinary Interpretation. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, vol. 124, p. 1942-2040, 
1939. Manning explains — This aspect of formalism makes itself felt in so-called “encroachment” cases, which deal with the 
claim that Congress has violated the separation of powers through its regulation or oversight of the executive or judicial powers. 
Because the Necessary and Proper Clause, as noted, gives Congress at least some authority to prescribe-and thus to shape and 
channel--the means by which all the branches carry their powers into execution,one cannot demonstrate impermissible legis-
lative encroachment merely by showing that a statute regulates or structures the exercise of another branch’s powers. Rather, 
the challenged arrangement must somehow affect those powers in a manner or to a degree that the Constitution otherwise 
prohibits. 
61  In short, the “private non delegation doctrine” is merely one application of the provisions of the Constitution that forbid 
Congress to allocate power to an ineligible entity, whether governmental or private. UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n 
of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1225.
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of governmental power and in the Vesting Clauses, commits them to three branches of 
Government.” Article I § 1 vests all legislative powers in the Congress.62 And under Arti-
cle II § 1, the executive power vests in the President of the United States.63 Thomas says 
“[t]hese grants are exclusive ... [and w]hen the Government is called upon to perform 
a function that requires an exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial power, only the 
vested recipient of that power can perform it.”64  
Additionally Thomas notes that the Constitution not only “allocate[es] power 
among the different branches[,]”but it also “identifies certain restrictions on the manner 
in which those power are to be executed.”65 The Constitution requires, in Article I, § 7 cl. 
2, that Congress exercise its legislative power through the manner of bicameralism and 
presentment. The Article states that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the Pre-
sident of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it...”66 
Thomas says that “the Constitution is less specific about how the President shall 
exercise [executive] power, it is clear that he may carry out his duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed with the aid of subordinates.”67 
Congress improperly delegates power when it “authoriz[es] an entity to exercise 
power in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution.”68 Congress “improperly dele-
gates legislative power to itself when it authorizes itself to act without bicameralism 
and presentment.”69 Congress also acts in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution 
when it “authorizes the exercise of executive power” to “individuals or groups outside 
the President’s control to perform a function that requires the exercise of that power.”70 
Thomas recognizes that in some cases “[i]t may never be possibly perfect to dis-
tinguish between legislative and executive power, but that does not mean we may look 
the other way when the Government asks us to apply a legally binding rule that is not 
enacted by Congress pursuant to Article I.”71 
62  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1225.
63  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1240 (Thomas, 
J. concurring) 
64  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1225.
65  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1225.
66  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225 at 1225
67  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1253 (2015) 
(Thomas, J. concurring).
68  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1253 (2015) 
(Thomas, J. concurring).
69  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. (citing INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)). 
70  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. (citing Free Enter-
prise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)). 
71  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. at 1251-52 (2015) 
(Thomas, J. concurring). 
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In instances where the court is uncertain whether the power at issue is executive 
or legislative, the Court has analyzed the power from both perspectives. 
According to Justice Thomas, it should matter little whether the Smithsonian is 
labeled a federal agency, a trust instrumentality, or private entity. The ultimate question 
whether the government created “entity is properly constituted to exercise a power un-
der one of the Vesting clauses.”72 If it is not “properly constituted to do so, it is no better 
qualified to be an agent of that power that a purely private entity.”73 Thus, the question 
is whether the Board of Regents properly constituted to exercise a power under one of 
the Vesting Clauses?
The analysis has two steps. The first is to classify the power the legislation pur-
ports to authorize the entity (government instrumentality) to exercise. Second would 
be to “determine whether the Constitution’s requirements for the exercise of that power 
have been satisfied.”74 According to Justice Thomas the: 
first constraint is illustrated by the Court’s holdings in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 
U.S. 189 (1928), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Springer involved the validity 
of Acts of the Philippine Legislature that authorized a committee of three—two legisla-
tors and one executive—to vote corporate stock owned by the Philippine Government. 
Because the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands incorporated the separation-of-powers 
principle, and because the challenged statute authorized two legislators to perform the 
executive function of controlling the management of the government-owned corpora-
tions, the Court held the statutes invalid.75  
 The second constraint is illustrated by our decision in Chadha. That case involved the 
validity of a statute that authorized either House of Congress by resolution to invali-
date a decision by the Attorney General to allow a deportable alien to remain in the 
United States. Congress had the power to achieve that result through legislation, but 
the statute was nevertheless invalid because Congress cannot exercise its legislative 
power to enact laws without following the bicameral and presentment procedures 
specified in Article I.76  
72  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct. at 1251-52 (2015) 
(Thomas, J. concurring).
73  at 1251-52 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring).
74  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct., 1253 (2015) 
(Thomas, J. concurring). 
75  UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States. 135 S. Ct., 1253 (2015) 
(Thomas, J. concurring). 
76  135 S. Ct. 1225 (citing UNITED STATES. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R Passenger Corp. Supreme Court Of The United States. 513 U.S. 
374, 377-78 (1995)). 
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In Dong, the court said in dicta it was concerned about having members of the 
judicial and legislative branches serving on the Smithsonian’s governing board becau-
se if the Institution was an executive branch establishment this could constitute a vio-
lation of the separation of powers.77 
5.2.  From Exercising Executive and Legislative Functions to Affecting 
Private Rights 
 The status of a number of actions by the Smithsonian and its Board of Regents in-
dicate possible separation of powers problems inherent in the work of the Smithsonian. 
In 1988, the Office of Legal Counsel offered its opinion that the Smithsonian 
was as an executive agency under the Federal Property and Administrative Services 
Act (“Property Act”), 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-54478 The Property Act is administered under the 
General Services Administration and establishes procedures for the management of 
governmental property. According to Section 3, the Property Act applies to “executive 
agencies” and to “federal agencies 79” defined as: 
(a) The term “executive agency” means any executive department or independent es-
tablishment in the executive branch of the Government, including any wholly owned 
Government corporation. 
 (b) The term “Federal agency” means any executive agency or any establishment in the 
legislative or judicial branch of the Government (except the Senate, the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the Architect of the Capitol and any activities under his direction). 
 
As the Office of Legal Counsel noted, “it has long been understood that tran-
sactions with the Smithsonian involving federal property or appropriated funds are 
subject to federal property and contract law.”80  Both the Smithsonian and Office of 
Legal Counsel agree the Property Act applies to the Smithsonian. The Smithsonian took 
the position that it was not an executive agency, but rather a Federal agency for the 
77  COLUMBIA. Dong v. Smithsonian Inst. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 125 F.3d 879 (D.C. Cir. 
1997).
78  KMIEC, Douglas W. The Status of the Smithsonian Institution Under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. 
Opinion of the Office of Legal Concern, Washington, vol. 12, 122-127, june 1988. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/
file/24096/download>. p. 124.
79  40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544. 
80  Act of Dec. 30, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-394, 96 Stat. 1966, 1991-92 (1982) (provisions for appropriations to the Smithsonian pre-
sume the applicability of the procurement provisions of the Property Act); 45 Comp. Gen. at 686-88; 12 Comp. Gen. 317 (1932). 
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purposes of The Property Act. Because Congress did not specify the status of the Smi-
thsonian for the Property Act and the legislative history was silent, the Office of Legal 
Counsel in its analysis found the strongest evidence in the fact that The Property Act re-
pealed the Smithsonian’s prior statutory authority for certain property exchanges and 
replaced it with a provision applicable only to executive agencies.81  
If the Property Act places the Smithsonian more firmly in the executive branch 
with regard to its source of funds, spending and acquisition of property, the court’s 
consideration of Cotton buttresses that notion. In Cotton, the court considered the Smi-
thsonian in terms of it governmental functions and found that it serves as “a center of 
scholarship and national museum responsible for the safekeeping and maintenance of 
national treasures.”82 The court considered that the Smithsonian received federal funds 
for many of its operations and has a majority of civil service employees. The Smithso-
nian employs more than 4,000 civil service staff – the other 2,000 are trust fund em-
ployees. The Smithsonian’s federal workers in the competitive service are paid for with 
federally appropriated funds, while the trust fund workers are paid with funds from 
business activities, gifts, grants, contracts and payout from the Smithsonian endow-
ment. As Picard notes, “by definition, the competitive service includes “all civil service 
positions in the executive branch.”83  
Who then oversees the Smithsonian workforce? Seemingly, by its founding 
charter, the trust-funded, non-civil service Smithsonian Secretary hired by the Board of 
Regents. But if the Regents are exercising executive power, they would seem to lack the 
requisite condition of having employees, particularly its executive branch civil service 
staff being subject to the President’s control.  
This issue became interesting during one of the Smithsonian’s major controver-
sies. In 1995, the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum planned an exhibition 
of the Enola Gay—the plane that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, leading to 
the end of World War II and ushering in the nuclear age. Veterans groups were shown 
the script of the exhibit in the planning stage and were incensed by what they saw as 
overly kind treatment of the Japanese as victims and the demonization of American 
forces and leaders in the decision to drop the bomb. The protested to members of Con-
gress and to President Clinton. 81 members of Congress signed a letter calling for the 
dismissal of the Air and Space Museum director Martin Harwitt.84 President Clinton as 
81  KMIEC, Douglas W. The Status of the Smithsonian Institution Under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. 
Opinion of the Office of Legal Concern, Washington, vol. 12, 122-127, june 1988. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/
file/24096/download>. p. 124.
82  COLUMBIA. Cotton v. Adams. District Court for the District of Columbia - June 26. 1992. 798 F. Supp. 22, 24. 
83  5 U.S.C. § 2102 (a)(1) (2006).  
84  HIRSCH, Arthur. Smithsonian Cancels Exhibit on Atomic Bomb. Baltimore Sun Times, Baltimore, jan. 31, 1995. Available at: 
<http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-01-31/features/1995031159_1_heyman-atomic-enola-gay>.
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the head of the executive branch had no removal authority, no ability to fire Harwitt nor 
dismiss Heyman. In the end, Harwitt resigned.85  
For Regents, the process of removal is more complex and rare. There is only one 
instance where a Regent was removed from his position.86 Congress removed the Re-
gent by joint resolution. This was during the Civil War. The Regent was a member of the 
House of Representatives and the reason for his expulsion was for providing “aid and 
comfort to enemies of the government.”87-88 
If there are issues with executive functions, the Smithsonian has also ventured 
into what seem like legislative matters. The Board of Regents has promulgated stan-
dards and directives that decree what may be accepted into the national collections, 
rules about what kind of donations may be accepted and so on without necessarily ha-
ving explicit legislative authority to do so. These may be regarded as somewhat minor 
infractions, but sometimes they emerge as contentious. For example, most of the Smi-
thsonian’s national museums have been created by Congressional legislation, but the 
Smithsonian has itself created the Cooper-Hewitt Smithsonian Design Museum and the 
Anacostia Community Museum without legislation, earning Congressional criticism.   
This seeming Smithsonian infringement on legislative authority emerged in a 
controversy in 1985 where the former Smithsonian Secretary S. Dillon Ripley had nego-
tiated a $5 million gift from the Government of Saudi Arabia for support of a Center for 
Islamic Arts and Culture to be part of the Smithsonian International Center, to be loca-
ted in the Smithsonian’s newly built Quadrangle building complex adjacent to its Cas-
tle headquarters on the National Mall and largely underground.89  The Smithsonian’s 
plan was for the Quadrangle to house the National Museum of African Art, the Sackler 
Gallery of Asian Art and the International Center. Ripley’s plan was to couple the Saudi 
gift with appropriated federal funds to support the enterprise, and in the Smithsonian 
agreement with the Saudis, the Smithsonian agreed to rename a gallery the Asian and 
African Gallery.90 Sidney Yates, the chair of the House subcommittee on appropriations 
overseeing the Smithsonian’s federal budget the arrangement, and renaming some-
thing approved by Congress came as a surprise to him and were unacceptable. The 
85  Official Resigns Over Exhibit of Enola Gay, New York Times (May 3, 1995), Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/03/
us/official-resigns-over-exhibit-of-enola-gay.html>.   
86  H.R.J. Res. 21, 37th Cong. (1868).
87  H.R.J. Res. 21, 37th Cong. (1868). 
88  SMITHSONIAN. 20 U.S.C. §§ 44-80; Smithsonian Inst. Bylaws of the Board of Regents §§ 1.01-6.06 (2014); Smithsonian 
Directives (2013). 
89  BATTIATA, Mary. Saudi Gift Controversy at the Smithsonian. Washington Post, Washington, 9 oct. 1985. Available at: <https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1985/10/09/saudi-gift-controversy-at-thesmithsonian/ac61fda89bf5-4398-9b-
78-296ed18e7678/>.
90  BATTIATA, Mary. Saudi Gift Controversy at the Smithsonian. Washington Post, Washington, 9 oct. 1985. Available at: <https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1985/10/09/saudi-gift-controversy-at-thesmithsonian/ac61fda89bf5-4398-9b-
78-296ed18e7678/>.
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Regents agreed to renege on the deal, and returned the Saudi gift.91 The Washington 
Post opined that the controversy could “be attributed to the Smithsonian’s unique, qua-
si-federal status,” as well as Ripley’s ruling style which Congressional critics charged was 
“Kremlinesque” as he failed to “tell Capitol Hill too much about what it was doing.”92
The question is whether or not these indiscretions really amount to much le-
gally. For Scalia, dissenting in Mistretta v. United States, declared that, “where no go-
vernment power is at issue, there is no strict constitutional impediment to a branchless 
agency...”93 Scalia dissented on the formation of a Sentencing Commission because “[t]
he lawmaking function of the Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any 
responsibility for execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the law.94 
“[T]he Commission neither exercises any executive power on its own, nor is subject to 
control of the President ...”95 “The only functions it performs...are data collection and 
intragovernmental advice giving and educational [activities] ...similar to the functions 
performed by congressional agencies and even congressional staff [that] neither deter-
mine nor affect private rights, and do not constitute an exercise of government power.96 
Courts and the Office of Legal Counsel have seized on the similar notion that 
the work “currently exercised by the presently existing congressional agencies” such as 
the “functions undertaken by the Library of Congress, the basic accounting tasks of the 
Government Accounting Office, and all of the duties of the Architect of the Capitol can 
comfortably be described as in aid of the legislative process.”97 Even the Smithsonian’s 
and its bureaus’ activities, the Office of Legal Counsel claims, “fit under a broad cons-
truction” of providing aid to the legislative branch. In short, the Office of Legal Counsel 
opines, that the exercise of powers by such agencies “may be deemed constitutionally 
harmless.”98 
So, does the Smithsonian exercise government power that might affect private 
rights?, because that was indeed the issue in Dep’t of Transp., where Amtrak with FRA 
91  BATTIATA, Mary. Saudi Gift Controversy at the Smithsonian. Washington Post, Washington, 9 oct. 1985. Available at: <https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1985/10/09/saudi-gift-controversy-at-the smithsonian/ac61fda89bf5-4398-9b-
78-296ed18e7678/>.
92  BATTIATA, Mary. Saudi Gift Controversy at the Smithsonian. Washington Post, Washington, 9 oct. 1985. Available at: <https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1985/10/09/saudi-gift-controversy-at-the smithsonian/ac61fda89bf5-4398-9b-
78-296ed18e7678/>.
93  UNITED STATES. Mistretta v. United States. Supreme Court of United States. 488 U.S. 361, 423 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94  UNITED STATES. Mistretta v. United States. Supreme Court of United States. 488 U.S. at 420 (1989).
95  UNITED STATES. Mistretta v. United States. Supreme Court of United States. 488 U.S. at 420 (1989).
96  UNITED STATES. Mistretta v. United States. Supreme Court of United States. 488 U.S. at 420-412 (1989). (emphasis added) 
97  DELLINGER, Walter. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress. Opinion of the Office of 
Legal Concern, Washington, vol. 20. p. 124-181, may 1996. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opi-
nions/1996/05/31/op-olc-v020-p0124_0.pdf>. p. 172.
98  DELLINGER, Walter. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress. Opinion of the Office of 
Legal Concern, Washington, vol. 20. p. 124-181, may 1996. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opi-
nions/1996/05/31/op-olc-v020-p0124_0.pdf>. p. 172.
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was exercising government power by creating a regulatory standard that affected pri-
vate rights.  When a government instrumentality performs a function that determines 
or affects private rights or the prerogatives of the other branches,” that entity is exerci-
sing government powers.99  
The Smithsonian has historically exercised such powers with regard to excava-
tions and the collection of both antiquities and objects of natural history.  The Anti-
quities Act of 1906 provided a federal mechanism for the retrieval of these objects on 
federal land.100  Many of the sites were Native American historic and prehistoric sites. 
Excavating on those sites required a permit, and such permits were originally issued 
only by the Smithsonian Institution.101  This had the advantage of professionalizing ar-
chaeology early on by restricting such activities to competent scholars and scientists. 
But it also restricted access and availability of Native items to their tribes and tribal 
members.  Other laws through the 20th century authorized the Smithsonian to “coo-
perate with any State, educational institution, or scientific organization in the United 
States to continue independently or in cooperation anthropological researches among 
the American Indians and the natives of lands and the excavation and preservation of 
archaeological remains.102  Such provided that “all such cooperative work and division 
of the result thereof shall be under the direction of the Secretary of the Smithsonian 
Institution.”103 “Where lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the 
National Park Service, cooperative work would proceed under regulations and condi-
tions as the Secretary of the Interior may provide.”104 
This role of the Smithsonian extended to lands that might be flooded by Gover-
nment built dams with consequences for private property. “The Secretary of the Smi-
thsonian Institution is authorized to cooperate with any State, educational institution, 
or scientific organization in the United States for continuing paleontological investi-
gations, and the excavation and preservation of fossil remains, in areas which will be 
flooded by the construction of Government dams or otherwise be made unavailable 
99  See UNITED STATES. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads. Supreme Court of the United States.135 S. Ct. 1225, 1253 
(2015); UNITED STATES. Mistretta v. United States. Supreme Court of United States. 488 U.S. 361, 425 n3 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued – There are of course agencies within the Judicial Branch (because they operate 
under the control of courts or judges) which are not themselves courts, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts), just as there are agencies within the Legislative Branch (because they operate under the control of 
Congress) which are not themselves Senators or Representatives, see, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (General Accounting Office). 
But these agencies, unlike the Sentencing Commission, exercise no governmental powers, that is, they establish and determine 
neither private rights nor the prerogatives of the other Branches. They merely assist the courts and the Congress in their exercise 
of judicial and legislative powers. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 425 n3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100  UNITED STATES. The Antiquities Act, 1900-06 (codified 16 U.S.C. §§ 431- 433 (2009))
101  UNITED STATES. The Antiquities Act, 1900-06 (codified 16 U.S.C. §§ 431- 433 (2009))
102  20 U.S.C. § 69.
103  20 U.S.C. § 70. 
104  20 U.S.C. § 70.
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for such investigations because of such construction.”105 Even now, with the passage 
of the National Museum of the American Indian Act in 1989 which applies solely to the 
Smithsonian,106 and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NA-
GPRA), passed in 1990,107 the Department of Interior relies on discretionary standards 
developed and promulgated by the Smithsonian to make decisions about repatriation 
of human materials, sacred and funerary objects to Native peoples.108 To the extent that 
the Smithsonian engages in these types of activities and establishes standards affec-
ting private rights, it is either an impermissible exercise of executive power—assuming 
it is a legislative agency; but if it is in the legislative branch then it is an impermissible 
exercise of legislative power because the Regent resolution process fails to comply with 
the bicameralism and presentment requirement.  
5.3.  Ineligibility of Appointment 
 The most obvious violation of the separation of powers is the membership on 
the Board of Regents, particularly with regard to its Congressional members. According 
to the U.S. Constitution:  
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appoin-
ted to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been 
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and 
no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House 
during his Continuance in Office.109  
The question then becomes, does being a Regent of the Smithsonian qualify as 
holding any Office under the United States? 
According to DOJ, “The most common problem under the Ineligibility Clause 
arises from legislation that creates a commission or other entity and simultaneously 
requires certain ...members be Representatives or Senators, either ex officio or by se-
lection or nomination by congressional leadership.”110 Although advisory or purely ce-
105  20 U.S.C. § 78. 
106  UNITED STATES. National Museum of the American Indian Act, Public Law. 101-185, 103 Stat. 1336 (Nov. 28, 1989) . 
107  UNITED STATES. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Public Law. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (Nov. 16, 1990). 
108  MITTAL, Anu K. Key Federal Agencies’ and the Smithsonian Institution’s efforts to Identify and Repatriate Indian Hu-
man Remains and Objects. Available at: <http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126466.pdf>.
109  UNITED STATES.  Constitution. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 
110  DELLINGER, Walter. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress. Opinion of the Office of 
Legal Concern, Washington, vol. 20. p. 124-181, may 1996. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opi-
nions/1996/05/31/op-olc-v020-p0124_0.pdf>. p. 160.
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remonial roles are permissible, appointing a currently serving member of Congress to 
a role in which he would perform executive functions would violate the Ineligibility 
Clause.111Given that the Smithsonian Congressional Regents are appointed respecti-
vely by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, ie., their role as Re-
gents would violate the ineligibility clause to the extent the duties of the Regents were 
regarded as performing executive functions.  
According to DOJ “designating a member of Congress to serve on a commission 
with any executive functions, even in what was expressed a purely ceremonial role, 
may render the delegation of significant governmental authority to the commission 
unconstitutional as a violation of the anti-agrandizement principle.”
Both MWAA and Springer struck down on general separation of powers prin-
ciples provisions that envisioned the presence of legislators on managerial boards of 
public entities engaged in proprietary activities.112
Interestingly enough, the same problem might not obtain for judges and parti-
cularly the Chief Justice who serves on the Board of Regents. In Mistretta v. United States, 
“the principle of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit Article III judges 
from serving on commissions...”113 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The Smithsonian cannot survive a formalist critique of its status as a violation of 
the separation of powers. While the Smithsonian is clearly a government entity, and as it 
itself describes an “instrumentality” of the U.S., its powers are unclear. Its powers cannot 
be clearly described as judicial, legislative or executive. Its connection to the Vesting 
clauses is also unclear. While they perhaps tend toward the executive, the Smithsonian 
governing Board of Regents has no direct connection with the President of the United 
States. Though the President is legally the presiding officer of the “establishment, that 
body exercises no power and has not met in almost 90 years. Furthermore, no one on 
the Board of Regents, nor the Secretary of the Smithsonian is appointed by the Presi-
dent. The composition of the Board of Regents is problematic, particularly members of 
Congress. Norton’s idea for the reformation of the Board, which would mean Congress 
appointing all private individuals to the Board of Regents would eliminate the latter 
problem.  Alternatives might be reforming the Smithsonian to make it more clearly 
federal and executive, like the National Archives and Record Administration that has a 
111  DELLINGER, Walter. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress. Opinion of the Office of 
Legal Concern, Washington, vol. 20. p. 124-181, may 1996. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opi-
nions/1996/05/31/op-olc-v020-p0124_0.pdf>. p. 160.
112  Currie (“as an original matter one might argue that the separation of power provisions with which we are concerned . . . apply 
only to the business of governing, not to government-run business.”). 
113  UNITED STATES. Mistretta v. United States. Supreme Court of United States. 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) 
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similar mission or putting the Smithsonian under say the Department of the Interior in 
the executive branch, or placing it under the Congress, like the Library of Congress. But 
these alternatives remain unexplored and would involve a radical reformulation of the 
Smithsonian’s functions and certainly its board. More appropriately, the Smithsonian is 
likely to continue as has for 170 years, an early form of encroachment on the three bran-
ches theory of government, a bundle of contradictions and compromises based upon 
historical idiosyncrasy and convenience, bereft of principle, but none-the-less effective 
as the world’s largest and most popular museum, educational and research complex.
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